Atomic routing games on maximum congestion

Costas Busch, Malik Magdon-Ismail

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

27 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study atomic routing games on networks in which players choose a path with the objective of minimizing the maximum congestion along the edges of their path. The social cost is the global maximum congestion over all edges in the network. We show that the price of stability is 1. The price of anarchy, P o A, is determined by topological properties of the network. In particular, P o A = O (ℓ + log n), where ℓ is the length of the longest path in the player strategy sets, and n is the size of the network. Further, κ - 1 ≤ P o A ≤ c (κ2 + log2 n), where κ is the length of the longest cycle in the network, and c is a constant.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)3337-3347
Number of pages11
JournalTheoretical Computer Science
Volume410
Issue number36
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 31 2009

Keywords

  • Algorithmic game theory
  • Congestion game
  • Nash equilibrium
  • Price of anarchy
  • Routing game

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

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