Energy efficient connectivity in ad hoc networks from user's and designer's perspective

Alex Kesselman, Dariusz Kowalski, Michael Segal

Research output: Contribution to journalConference article

Abstract

We consider a game that models the creation of a wireless ad hoc network, where nodes are owned by selfish agents. We study a novel cost sharing model in which agents may pay for the transmission power of the other nodes. Each agent has to satisfy some connectivity requirement in the final network and the goal is to minimize its payment with no regard to the overall system performance. We analyze two fundamental connectivity games, namely broadcast and convergecast. We study pure Nash equilibria and quantify the degradation in the network performance called the price of anarchy resulting from selfish behavior. We derive asymptotically tight bounds on the price of anarchy for these games. We also study centralized network design. One of the most important problems in wireless ad hoc networks is the minimum-energy broadcast. Recently, there appeared many new applications such as real-time multimedia, battlefield communications and rescue operations that impose stringent end-to-end latency requirement on the broadcasting time. However, the existing algorithms that minimize the broadcasting energy tend to produce solutions with high latency. In this paper we consider the problem of bounded-hop broadcast. We present approximation algorithms for this problem.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)3161-3165
Number of pages5
JournalIEEE International Conference on Communications
Volume5
StatePublished - Sep 13 2005
Externally publishedYes
Event2005 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2005 - Seoul, Korea, Republic of
Duration: May 16 2005May 20 2005

Fingerprint

Ad hoc networks
Wireless ad hoc networks
Broadcasting
Approximation algorithms
Network performance
Power transmission
Degradation
Communication
Costs

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Cite this

Energy efficient connectivity in ad hoc networks from user's and designer's perspective. / Kesselman, Alex; Kowalski, Dariusz; Segal, Michael.

In: IEEE International Conference on Communications, Vol. 5, 13.09.2005, p. 3161-3165.

Research output: Contribution to journalConference article

Kesselman, Alex ; Kowalski, Dariusz ; Segal, Michael. / Energy efficient connectivity in ad hoc networks from user's and designer's perspective. In: IEEE International Conference on Communications. 2005 ; Vol. 5. pp. 3161-3165.
@article{289332dbe91445dea4947bd604be43d9,
title = "Energy efficient connectivity in ad hoc networks from user's and designer's perspective",
abstract = "We consider a game that models the creation of a wireless ad hoc network, where nodes are owned by selfish agents. We study a novel cost sharing model in which agents may pay for the transmission power of the other nodes. Each agent has to satisfy some connectivity requirement in the final network and the goal is to minimize its payment with no regard to the overall system performance. We analyze two fundamental connectivity games, namely broadcast and convergecast. We study pure Nash equilibria and quantify the degradation in the network performance called the price of anarchy resulting from selfish behavior. We derive asymptotically tight bounds on the price of anarchy for these games. We also study centralized network design. One of the most important problems in wireless ad hoc networks is the minimum-energy broadcast. Recently, there appeared many new applications such as real-time multimedia, battlefield communications and rescue operations that impose stringent end-to-end latency requirement on the broadcasting time. However, the existing algorithms that minimize the broadcasting energy tend to produce solutions with high latency. In this paper we consider the problem of bounded-hop broadcast. We present approximation algorithms for this problem.",
author = "Alex Kesselman and Dariusz Kowalski and Michael Segal",
year = "2005",
month = "9",
day = "13",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "5",
pages = "3161--3165",
journal = "Conference Record - International Conference on Communications",
issn = "0536-1486",
publisher = "Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Energy efficient connectivity in ad hoc networks from user's and designer's perspective

AU - Kesselman, Alex

AU - Kowalski, Dariusz

AU - Segal, Michael

PY - 2005/9/13

Y1 - 2005/9/13

N2 - We consider a game that models the creation of a wireless ad hoc network, where nodes are owned by selfish agents. We study a novel cost sharing model in which agents may pay for the transmission power of the other nodes. Each agent has to satisfy some connectivity requirement in the final network and the goal is to minimize its payment with no regard to the overall system performance. We analyze two fundamental connectivity games, namely broadcast and convergecast. We study pure Nash equilibria and quantify the degradation in the network performance called the price of anarchy resulting from selfish behavior. We derive asymptotically tight bounds on the price of anarchy for these games. We also study centralized network design. One of the most important problems in wireless ad hoc networks is the minimum-energy broadcast. Recently, there appeared many new applications such as real-time multimedia, battlefield communications and rescue operations that impose stringent end-to-end latency requirement on the broadcasting time. However, the existing algorithms that minimize the broadcasting energy tend to produce solutions with high latency. In this paper we consider the problem of bounded-hop broadcast. We present approximation algorithms for this problem.

AB - We consider a game that models the creation of a wireless ad hoc network, where nodes are owned by selfish agents. We study a novel cost sharing model in which agents may pay for the transmission power of the other nodes. Each agent has to satisfy some connectivity requirement in the final network and the goal is to minimize its payment with no regard to the overall system performance. We analyze two fundamental connectivity games, namely broadcast and convergecast. We study pure Nash equilibria and quantify the degradation in the network performance called the price of anarchy resulting from selfish behavior. We derive asymptotically tight bounds on the price of anarchy for these games. We also study centralized network design. One of the most important problems in wireless ad hoc networks is the minimum-energy broadcast. Recently, there appeared many new applications such as real-time multimedia, battlefield communications and rescue operations that impose stringent end-to-end latency requirement on the broadcasting time. However, the existing algorithms that minimize the broadcasting energy tend to produce solutions with high latency. In this paper we consider the problem of bounded-hop broadcast. We present approximation algorithms for this problem.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=24344464948&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=24344464948&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Conference article

AN - SCOPUS:24344464948

VL - 5

SP - 3161

EP - 3165

JO - Conference Record - International Conference on Communications

JF - Conference Record - International Conference on Communications

SN - 0536-1486

ER -