IT Contract Flexibility and Negotiator Incentives

Tridas Mukhopadhyay, Eric Walden, Mark Andrew Thompson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Information Technology outsourcing contracts are plagued by inflexibility. We develop an economic model to explain how the contract negotiator's incentives influence contract flexibility. We show that neither wage nor one-time commission type pay gives any preference for flexibility. However, a promotion incentive, where the bonus is an ongoing bonus, does give the negotiator a preference for less flexible contracts. The preference for less flexible contracts increases as the discount rate increases. The preference for less flexible contracts increases as the number of competitors for the promotion increases.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)291-301
Number of pages11
JournalManagerial and Decision Economics
Volume38
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 1 2017

Fingerprint

Wages
Outsourcing
Information technology
Incentives
Economics
Bonus
Competitors
Incentive contracts
Discount rate
Preference for flexibility
Information technology outsourcing

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business and International Management
  • Strategy and Management
  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Management of Technology and Innovation

Cite this

IT Contract Flexibility and Negotiator Incentives. / Mukhopadhyay, Tridas; Walden, Eric; Thompson, Mark Andrew.

In: Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 38, No. 3, 01.04.2017, p. 291-301.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Mukhopadhyay, Tridas ; Walden, Eric ; Thompson, Mark Andrew. / IT Contract Flexibility and Negotiator Incentives. In: Managerial and Decision Economics. 2017 ; Vol. 38, No. 3. pp. 291-301.
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