Quality of routing congestion games in wireless sensor networks

Costas Busch, Rajgopal Kannan, Athanasios V. Vasilakos

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperpeer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider congestion games in wireless sensor networks that offer quantitatively distinct classes of routing paths. Each routing class is characterized by a service cost. Within a routing class, the maximum link congestion is also an important metric for measuring the quality of the paths. Here, we study routing games where each player i selfishly selects a path with a respective routing class that simultaneously minimizes its maximum edge congestion Ci and service cost Si, in other words minimizes Ci + Si. We examine the quality of Nash-equilibria and prove that the price of stability is 1. The price of anarchy is bounded above by min(C, S) · m log n, where m is the number of routing classes, n is the size of the graph, and C and S are the optimal coordinated congestion and service costs. Thus, under certain circumstances, the player’s selfishness does not hurt the social welfare and actually the equilibria can give good approximations for the coordinated optimal social cost.

Original languageEnglish (US)
DOIs
StatePublished - 2008
Externally publishedYes
Event4th Annual International Conference on Wireless Internet, WICON 2008 - Maui, United States
Duration: Nov 17 2008Nov 19 2008

Conference

Conference4th Annual International Conference on Wireless Internet, WICON 2008
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityMaui
Period11/17/0811/19/08

Keywords

  • Algorithmic game theory
  • Congestion games
  • Nash equilibrium
  • Price of anarchy
  • Price of stability

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Human-Computer Interaction
  • Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
  • Computer Networks and Communications

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