Market reactions to non-market strategy: Congressional testimony as an indicator of firm political influence

Jason W. Ridge, Amy Ingram, Mirzokhidjon Abdurakhmonov, Dinesh Hasija

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Research Summary: We argue that because influence in the political arena can net benefits for firms, investors will respond favorably to indications of firm political influence. We focus on testimony before Congress because it is one of the most highly sought after and influential points of governmental access. Our findings indicate that firms reap positive abnormal returns surrounding Congressional testimony and that investors respond more favorably to aspects of testimony that indicate additional political influence (i.e., witness status, testimony length, and committee jurisdiction). Further, we find regulatory risk strengthens the effect of witness status and testimony length while Congressional negativity strengthens the effect of witness status. Taken together, our results suggest that investors respond favorably to indications that firms have influence in the political arena. Managerial Summary: Our findings showcase that investors react positively to firm Congressional testimonies and their attributes, such as the status of a firm representative, the length of the testimony, and the committee industry jurisdiction. Further, we also find that investors will respond even more positively to these Congressional testimony attributes when a firm is facing high regulatory risk and when the Congressional representative's tone is negative. In general, our findings suggest that firms may gain market returns through obtaining public access to Congressional committees.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1644-1667
Number of pages24
JournalStrategic Management Journal
Volume40
Issue number10
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 1 2019
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Non-market strategy
Investors
Market reaction
Political influence
Jurisdiction
Market returns
Industry
Abnormal returns

Keywords

  • abnormal returns
  • congressional testimony
  • corporate political activity
  • political influence
  • screening theory

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business and International Management
  • Strategy and Management

Cite this

Market reactions to non-market strategy : Congressional testimony as an indicator of firm political influence. / Ridge, Jason W.; Ingram, Amy; Abdurakhmonov, Mirzokhidjon; Hasija, Dinesh.

In: Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 40, No. 10, 01.10.2019, p. 1644-1667.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Ridge, Jason W. ; Ingram, Amy ; Abdurakhmonov, Mirzokhidjon ; Hasija, Dinesh. / Market reactions to non-market strategy : Congressional testimony as an indicator of firm political influence. In: Strategic Management Journal. 2019 ; Vol. 40, No. 10. pp. 1644-1667.
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